Lehrstuhl Philosophie I 

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Freitag

 0621 / 181 - 2175


 605, Kaiserring 10-16, 6. OG., 68161 Mannheim

Sprechstunde: Dienstag, 16:00-16:30 Uhr


Forschungsprojekt am Lehrstuhl 

Mind the Meaning: The Philosophy of Psychological Expressivism

Workshop: Perspectives on First-Person Thought, May 16-18, 2019
Universität Mannheim, EO 150

Poster zum Workshop


Is there anything special about the way we think about ourselves, and in particular about our own inner world? It is sometimes said that thoughts about our own conscious states involve a kind of awareness that is fundamentally different from the one that comes with other thoughts. It is also often held that we cannot misrepresent the subject of our current expreriences, and that this phenomenon must be explained by an adequate theory of first-person thought. Yet it is difficult to discern what exactly these claims entail. Moreover, there is no unconctroversial way to relate phenomena of first-person thought to phenomena of first-person speech. When we utter self-ascriptions of mental states, do we thereby simply report in which state we are, or do we rather directly express the respective state?

Our aim in this workshop is to bring together researchers - including philosophers, linguists, and psychologists - who will address and dicuss these and other problems relating to first-person thought and the way it is articulated in speech.

The workshop will be the concluding event of the project The First Person - Semantic, Epistemic, and Scientific Perspectives (PI: Prof. Dr. Katharina Kraus, University of Notre Dame) and the inaugural workshop of the project Mind the Meaning: The Philosophy of Psychological Expressivism (PI: Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Freitag).


Bestätigte Referenten:


  • José Luis Bermúdez

  • Wolfgang Freitag

  • Manuel García-Carpintero

  • Mitchell Green

  • Daniel Gutzmann

  • Tim Henning

  • Katharina Kraus

  • Max Kölbel

  • Maik Niemeck

  • Ursula Renz

  • Gianfranco Soldati

  • Marc Andree Weber

  • Eunike Wetzel

  • Nadja-Mira Yolcu


Workshop: Suspension of Belief, Oct 26-27

Poster und Programm zum Workshop

We often suspend belief. Some questions we haven't considered yet, others are still under investigation, and yet others seem to allow for no definite answer. We often withhold belief and, more importantly, we do so rationally. Despite its core role in our doxastic everyday life, suspension of belief has not received much attention in the epistemological literature, which has mainly focused on positive belief alone. The workshop will fill this lacuna and investigate the nature and rational profile of suspension of belief.


Keine Studienberatung in den Osterferien


30. April: Gastvortrag "Leitmotive der Diskursethik im Kontext aktueller Debatten" von Prof. Dr. Micha Werner


Gastvorträge FSS 2019


Prof. Dr. Holger Sturm zu Gast am Philosophischen Seminar


KVV für das FSS 2019

PersonenLS Philosophie ILS Philosophie IILS Philosophie IIIStudiumInternationalEPGAK Philo